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The story of how Palestinian Islamic groups evolved is one of the most interesting case 
studies in modern Islamist politics. By looking at the roots of these organizations and 
their recruitment techniques, one gets a far better appreciation of the nature, appeal, and 
strategy of these groups. 
 
A key element in their development has been the struggle between Islamist and 
nationalist alternatives for the allegiance of individual Palestinians. Factionalism has also 
been an important dimension, given the multiplicity of groups deriving from the Muslim 
Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad tendencies. Also interesting is the relationship between 
Islamist organizations and educational institutions, which have served as important 
centers for finding, socializing, and mobilizing supporters.  
 
Until 1967, organized Islamic groups in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (henceforth called 
"the Territories") were situated in socio-religious centers and mosques run by the Waqf 
establishment, as well as several charity funds in Jerusalem and the West Bank. These 
groups drew most of their support from middle class traders who were beginning to 
develop in urban areas of the West Bank. 
 
In the Gaza Strip, the Muslim Brothers, active under the Egyptian civil regime despite 
Nasser's hostility to the Brothers' Egyptian branch, were influential in several mosques 
run by their supporters. In fact, until 1967, Islamic groups maintained a strong hold on 
the population of the Gaza Strip with almost exclusive control of all social organizations. 
The only Islamic group not affiliated with the Muslim Brothers was supporters of several 
shaykhs who had adopted a strict Salafi or Wahhabi line during their studies in Saudi 
Arabia. (Saudi Arabia supported the Egyptian Muslim Brothers during the course of its 
rivalry with Nasser's regime during the 1960s.)
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The Muslim Brothers were also dominant in the Jordanian-ruled West Bank. The 
Brothers controlled the Waqf establishment, operated legally, and even participated in the 
Jordanian government in the 1960s, though Jordanian security services did supervise the 
group tightly. The Jordanians restricted its movements, arrested its followers, and barred 
it from certain actions.
2 The group's only Islamic competitor was the Islamic Liberation 
Party (Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami), which was banned and persecuted by the government. 
Thus, the Brothers, who enjoyed some backing from the Saudi regime, were able to play 
an "open game" by mildly criticizing the government on internal affairs. 
 
Until 1967, the Muslim Brothers faced no real competition from secular nationalist 
groups in the Territories, such as the banned Jordanian Communist Party or the Syrian 
and Iraqi Ba’ath party. These groups attracted a very narrow stratum of intellectuals and 
  1university graduates. In Gaza, leftist organizations were often forced to collaborate with 
the Muslim Brothers as a result of joint imprisonment. 
  
Israel's entry into the Territories in 1967 brought considerable change in the nature of 
Islamic activities there. Islamic groups now enjoyed more freedom than in the past. This 
newfound freedom, coupled with changes that took place during the 1970s in the 
organizational pattern of Palestinian society in the Territories as whole, were central 
factors in the Palestinian Islamic resurrection of the 1980s. 
 
 
One of the central factors influencing Palestinians in the Territories since 1967 was 
socio-economic development, to which the Israelis were indifferent. The armed struggle 
waged by the Palestinian nationalist secular organizations from the onset of the 
occupation until the 1993-1994 period diverted Israeli attention away from Palestinian 
social processes. By the 1980s, these processes brought about several important results, 
including: 
 
·  A vast increase in the Palestinian population due to a high natural birthrate 
and immigration beginning in the late 1970s, as the number of Palestinians 
employed in the Persian Gulf sharply declined.
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·  A major drop in the average age in the Territories.
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·  A significant rise in the level of education and the number of educational 
institutes in the Territories concomitant with an awakening national awareness 
of the importance of education to political, economic, and social development.  
·   An increase in the standard of living among Palestinians, especially during 
the first half of the 1980s. The loss of income from Palestinian employment in 
Gulf countries was for by an increase in the number of laborers working in 
Israel and heavy funding since the late 1970s from Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) affiliates.
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·  The (conscious or unconscious) adoption of Israeli behavior, way of thinking, 
and modernization, and the forming of a middle class influenced by Israel as 
well as communication with the rest of the Arab world. 
 
The combination of these factors, together with an effort by the PLO and pro-Palestinian 
foreign organizations, gave rise to a Palestinian socio-political organizational foundation. 
Israel offered "covert help" in the sense that it did not interfere so long as it did not 
perceive an immediate military threat. This new foundation shifted the political national 
organizational weight from municipalities, which could easily be controlled by the 
Israelis, to a wide variety of new and growing institutions in the early 1980s. 
  
 
The West Bank, and later also the Gaza Strip, saw the emergence of research institutes, 
newspapers, information offices, workers' unions, professionals' unions, student 
committees, liberal organizations, youth movements, women's organizations, social 
organizations, and charity funds - all somehow connected to PLO factions. Also notable 
  2is the fact that this socio-political base was centered in East Jerusalem, which was 
regaining its importance in relation to West Bank Arab municipalities. 
  
One of the main factors enhancing the development of this national foundation was the 
growth of higher education institutions in the Territories at the end of the 1970s. These 
bodies soon became central to Palestinian political and social development in the 
Territories. They offered social mobility to groups that previously did not have access to 
the higher education system. In the West Bank, for example, and even more so in Gaza's 
Islamic University, a large percentage of students came from refugee camps, small 
villages, and lower income families.
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These colleges and universities not only enhanced Palestinian political national 
awareness but also introduced the PLO's structure to the Territories as a supra-
organization comprised of several active groups such as ideological movements and even 
political parties.
7 Until this point, the PLO manifested itself only in the military-terrorist 
field and in the prisons where convicted terrorists were sent. 
 
The political organization that developed across university campuses in the Territories 
and its social impact led to two processes that quickly influenced the entire population 
and its organizational structure. The first process was the almost total filling of the 
political void in the Territories. Gradually the entire younger generation - now the vast 
majority of the population - identified politically with either the PLO, an Islamic faction, 
the Communist Party, or Jordanian supporters. Even Israel, in the early 1980s, attempted 
(and failed) to start an organization of village associations that would lead a faction 
accepting the Israeli presence in the Territories.  
 
The second process was the politicization of almost every aspect of Palestinian life. 
Relatively democratic election patterns and organizations were formed under Palestinian 
national political influence, perhaps also due to unconscious impression of Israeli 
democracy. Party-like structures developed in the Territories which allowed the PLO to 
exercise social, political, and economic control both from inside and from outside of the 
Territories. 
 
These processes - beginning in the early 1980s - were actually part of a larger 
transformation of Palestinian society toward creating a basis for a forthcoming state. The 
core of Palestinian nationalism was transferred inward, from the refugee camps in 
Lebanon to the Territories, and from external Arab patronage to direct struggle with 
Israel. 
 
 
Along with these socio-political processes, another process was also taking place - an 
indigenous Islamic resurrection that aimed to mold the character of the Palestinian state-
to-be, which could follow in an Islamic or national secular direction. 
 
Because of the importance of universities in the Territories in shaping the ideologies of 
secular nationalist activists, Islamic factions decided to pour a heavy effort into their 
  3campus presence, especially since many students came from villages and refugee camps 
where Islam already had a relatively strong presence. It should be noted that for the 
Islamic groups, education, starting at a very young age, was a primary part of their socio-
political activity. 
 
The Muslim Brothers in particular focused on education. They had consistently 
abstained, from the beginning of the Israeli occupation until the Palestinian uprising - 
intifada -  twenty years later, from any "armed struggle" against Israel, a main activity of 
all PLO-affiliated organizations. Just as the Muslim Brothers hoped to offer an 
alternative socio-political character to the future Palestinian state, they were also an 
alternative to violent protest until the uprising. 
 
When, in the 1990s, the Palestinian national leadership chose to compromise with Israel 
and abandon terrorism, the Muslim Brothers remained an alternative and undertook 
terrorism in the guise of Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The twenty years preceding the 
forming of Hamas were for the Brothers a period of building and reinforcing their social 
foundation through their influence in the educational arena and in the almost total control 
they had obtained in the mosques. 
 
 
For the Muslim Brothers, the development of socio-political organizations and their 
student activities gave the Islamic cause a significant push, which was crucial to the 
revolutionary faction of Islamic Jihad. The Islamic groups in the universities began 
forming as soon as the national secular groups did and an overt ideological rivalry soon 
developed. 
 
While Islamic groups kept pace with their national secular counterparts in universities, 
they lagged behind in other fields. For example, no Islamic factions were formed in 
organizations such as workers' unions, professional unions, or economic and social 
societies. No bodies, such as unions or Islamic information centers, were created, apart 
from student bulletins and charity funds. Until 1988, several centers for the preservation 
of Islamic heritage were founded, but far fewer than similar centers founded by 
nationalist groups. For example, in January 1983, one such center was founded in 
Jerusalem by the Waqf administration, which mainly documented Arab and Turkish 
manuscripts. In 1986, a research center which doubled as an Islamic library from the 
estate of the Al-Husayni family, was founded on behalf of the "Arab Child's House."
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However, until the founding of Hamas at the beginning of the intifada, universities 
remained the main public arena where Islamic organizations concentrated their presence. 
 
Several reasons explain why Islamic organizations failed to engage in a full range of 
socio-political activities, like their nationalist rivals. First, outside funding from the PLO, 
which was crucial to building up the nationalist base, did not reach Islamic groups. 
Similarly, these groups - which did not turn violent until late 1986 - did not enjoy the 
large funds that supported terrorism or compensated the families of prisoners and dead 
activists. 
 
  4Second, the Muslim Brothers' senior leadership, which in the West Bank was relatively 
older than its nationalist equivalent, worked in the traditional ways of the 1950s and 
1960s. To attain public influence, it invested in social communal activities, charity funds, 
and religious centers such as the Waqf and mosques. For some of them, activities such as 
charity, selling Islamic literature, preaching, and distributing cassettes, were considered 
much more efficient than publishing newspapers and pamphlets or building a foundation 
of institutes taken from Western culture. The organized propaganda used by Hamas since 
its inception was engineered by younger activists who had learned from their nationalist 
colleagues in universities in the Territories or abroad. 
 
Third, while the revolutionary faction of Islamic Jihad mimicked the activities of the 
Egyptian Islamic groups, where the student arena was also very central, other factions, 
especially the Salafi-based ones, were composed of people with little education who 
emphasized secret, armed activities and not building a large public base. 
 
Fourth, the rivalry between Islamic groups and nationalist secular parties in colleges and 
universities very rarely reached the public sphere, and if so, it was almost exclusively in 
the Gaza Strip. Thus, there was no widespread competition for public support. 
 
Fifth, the purpose of building an organizational infrastructure was to expand national 
awareness of the PLO as an exclusive Palestinian leadership ahead of future statehood. It 
was therefore built according to the accepted Arab national model. Islamic groups, on the 
other hand, envisioned the founding of an Islamic state at first narrowed to the entire land 
of Palestine and then enlarged to include the entire Islamic Arab world. Thus, their 
organizational emphasis was different.  
 
Still, the Brothers' limited focus is surprising given that the Egyptian Muslim Brothers - 
who served as a model for branches in other countries - had developed front 
organizations until the early 1950s, similar to those of secular groups. The Muslim 
Brothers in Egypt, Jordan, and the Gulf states had published Islamic newspapers and 
periodicals, as did other Islamic groups in Europe and the United States. 
 
While secular groups established financial institutes and became heavily involved in 
professional or workers' unions, Islamic groups centered their activities in mosques 
which served as a communal factor no less than a religious one. Through the mosques, 
Islamic groups promoted awareness (wa’i), religious education, preaching and 
ideological, political, and social indoctrination, financial activity through charity funds, 
sports activities, and more. 
 
After 1967, due to the relative freedom Israel granted them and constant connections with 
the Jordanian regime and its supporters, the national secular network did not pose a 
significant threat to the Islamic groups' stable position. In addition, the national base in 
the West Bank, where most of the population was rural and even traditional, did not have 
a political manifestation contradicting the Muslim Brothers' ideology. In the Gaza Strip, 
where the Muslim Brothers were always popular, secular nationalist groups developed 
slowly, and only sped up in the middle of the 1980s. In fact, in Gaza's Islamic University 
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full control over the administration and the male and female student councils. 
 
To a certain extent, however, the Muslim Brothers underestimated the institutional 
strength of the PLO factions. This was proven at the onset of the intifada, when the 
nationalist leadership in the Territories succeeded in controlling the population and the 
uprising's course, even before the outside directive from the PLO. More so, the uprising 
itself was a manifestation of the mood fostered mainly by the nationalist factions and 
using their foundation that was built in the 1980s. 
 
Colleges and universities, however, were an exception. Hence, they were very important 
to the organizational growth of the Islamic Jihad factions, especially its revolutionary 
one, though the Muslim Brothers' groups conducted the main Islamic activity. 
 
What is special about these groups' publications is that they were locally produced, not 
imported like most of the Islamic literature being circulated. The percentage of local 
articles - as opposed to photocopied ones published in Islamic bulletins abroad - rose 
greatly in the 1980s. Previously, very few thinkers originated from Palestinian Islamic 
groups and until the establishment of Hamas, the groups imported all of their ideals. 
 
The Islamic groups were independently organized in every one of the higher education 
institutes that were closed down after the uprising began. Once a year the groups 
convened a quasi-general assembly of their representatives, usually during al-Israa' wal-
Mi'raj events in Al-Aqsa mosque. The last assembly prior to the uprising took place in 
April 1987
9 and dealt with current issues in the Islamic Arab world. The groups attacked 
Arab regimes - including Palestinians - that supported a compromise with Israel. This 
hardline stance can perhaps be explained by the fact that the assembly took place at the 
same time as the National Palestinian Council meeting in Algiers, which brought the 
beginning of a turn toward a political solution.  
 
The Islamic groups' main activities were focused on events and ceremonies for Islamic 
holidays or ancient Islamic history. They also organized exhibits of Islamic books and 
fairs and circulated bulletins, books, and sundry Islamic publications, mainly published 
from 1982. This year marked a new stage in the organizational pattern of the Islamic 
groups in institutions of higher learning. 
 
More than one factor influenced the change in Islamic groups' orientation, including 
Israel's invasion of Lebanon and Sadat's murder, as well as the trials of Egyptian Jihad 
organization members. It appears that the "Lebanese effect" had to do not only with the 
Israeli control over southern Lebanon, but also with the infiltration of Iranian forces and 
the fallout from Iran's Islamic revolution that spurred the growth of the revolutionary 
faction of the Islamic Jihad. 
 
The first publications in the spirit of the revolutionary Islamic Jihad, which probably 
posed a certain threat to the Muslim Brothers and also hastened their own publications, 
came from the Muslim Youth Association in Jerusalem. It was a series of three booklets 
  6that were once published under different names:
10 Al-Nur, Al-Nur Al-Rabbani, and Al-
Nur Al-Ilahi.
11 The first was published in May-June 1982, before Israel's invasion of 
Lebanon, and its content reveals the influence of the Egyptian monthly Al-Mukhtar al-
Islami of the radical Islamic groups in Egypt. The main issues featured in this publication 
and in subsequent ones were copied from the Egyptian publication and written by Dr. 'Iz 
al-Din Ibrahim, then one of the literary pseudonyms of Dr. Fathi Shqaqi, the founder of 
the revolutionary Islamic Jihad in Gaza.
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The first publications of the Muslim Brothers groups were a combination of photocopied 
material from abroad and handwritten articles and news items, mostly discussing the 
situation of Palestinian higher education. For example, a publication named Al-Risalah 
was published in November 1982 by the Hebron University student council, then led by 
the Muslim Brothers.
13 It featured an interview with a student named Muhammad Harb, 
an active communist who repented and became a supporter of the Islamic group (another 
name for the Muslim Brothers).
14 The interview, propaganda against the communists, 
also accused nationalist groups of creating disturbances in the university aimed at causing 
the Israeli army to arrest Muslim students. This claim occasionally reappeared to justify 
why Islamic groups did not participate in demonstrations against the Israeli army, since 
these were viewed as provocations with no "pure" intent. 
 
The publication also contained a list of student council activities during 1982 that 
indicates the Islamic groups' mode of operation. Consider the following examples: 
 
·  Opening two mosques, one for male students and one for female students, 
·  Distributing free robes to needy female students, 
·  The sale of discounted books,  
·  Performing a ceremony for the birth (mawlid) of the Prophet. Among those 
registered as present were leaders of the Muslim Brothers such as Shaykh 
Ahmad Yassin from Gaza and Muhammad Fuad Abu Zaid from Qabatya/Jenin, 
·  A medical services card, 
·  Performing wide scale fundraising in "Palestine" raising 15,000 dinars, 
·  The noting of historic dates such as the Balfour declaration and the partition 
decision, 
·  Holding a Hebrew learning course, 
·  Collecting 1,600 dinars to pay for fines given to imprisoned students, 
·  Blood donations for several residents.
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One of the main issues preoccupying Islamic students was "immoral behavior" in 
colleges and universities. Many students attended daily meetings between Muslims and 
Christians, some of whom were more liberal regarding cross-gender relations. Some 
Christians also belonged to the Marxist organizations that advocated relative equality 
between the sexes. As a rule, the move from a strict, closed village society into an open 
one with daily cross-gender interactions, led to behavior strongly condemned by the 
Islamic groups. 
 
  7In an Al-Muntalaq issue published in Al-Najah University's bulletin, the immoral 
behavior of the student council - "corruption and debauchery" - is cited as a direct reason 
for the founding of the Islamic group in 1987.
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One of the issues at the top of the Islamic groups' agenda was friction with the 
administrations of other universities, especially the two considered more secular and 
nationalist—Bir Zeit University and Al-Najah University in the West Bank. In both, there 
was a connection (and sometimes common interest) between the administration and 
nationalist student parties. Apart from disagreements on mundane issues such as tuition 
and dorms, the Islamic groups confronted the administration while attempting to conduct 
separate events, usually with Islamic content, that were usually points of tension between 
the rival parties, interfered with studies, led to conflicts that extended beyond university 
walls. 
 
In both these institutions, and surely in Freres College (which became Bethlehem 
University), there was also Christian influence which added to the tension. In one Al-
Muntalaq issue, the university administration is called "the hostile crusade 
management."
17 Reference to Christian students in the Islamic publications was rare.  
  
The February 1984 Al-Muntalaq bulletin surveyed the achievements of Al-Najah 
University's Islamic group six years after its establishment. It is interesting to see how the 
Islamic group's followers classified the achievements in order of importance. The first 
was developing an Islamic personality and saving young men and women from moral and 
ideological deterioration; the second was building two separate mosques for men and 
women; the third was giving scholarships and loans to needy students; and the fourth was 
supplying Islamic books. Only in thirteenth place one can find activities which may be 
viewed as socio-political, copied from the nationalist groups and first introduced to the 
Territories by the Communist Party: one day of volunteer work in Gaza and two in the 
university itself.
18 
 
The volunteer framework was developed by leftist groups in the Territories as early as 
the second half of the 1970s and was adopted by Fatah supporters the following decade. 
It was turned into one of the main elements of the younger generation's organization in 
all aspects of political and social life in the Territories in the framework of what was 
called "the youth committees for social work" (lijan al-shabibah lil-'amal al-ijtima'i) 
popularly known as "Shabibah." Much of the volunteering consisted of charity work. 
 
Volunteer days could be found only in the colleges and universities and was part of the 
Islamic groups' influence there. The Islamic groups did not, however, form voluntary 
front organizations, as did the nationalist groups, with the exception of the Islamic group 
at Gaza's Islamic University, which operated a voluntary labor committee. The dominant 
influence of the Muslim Brothers at Islamic University perhaps accounts for the rise of 
such a committee there. Indeed, an Islamic workers' union also formed at the university 
that doubled as an organizational center for the Muslim Brothers.
19 
 
  8Islamic groups were also concerned with the recurring closings of educational institutions 
by the Israelis, whether due to violent clashes among students or to clashes with the army 
and riots. The Islamic groups placed the utmost importance on maintaining regular 
studies in the Territories, as demonstrated by an Al-Muntalaq editorial from December 
1984: 
 
"Owing to the reopening of the university after a forced closure of four 
whole months, we cannot but congratulate the new and senior brothers and 
sisters…. We appeal to the senior students to be sensible and serve the 
public interest and abandon the activities that bring the university to give 
our enemies a golden opportunity…. We call upon our new brothers to see 
things clearly and understand that regular studies and the opening of the 
university are the peak of constructive positive activity, and this is what our 
people and nation want."
20 
 
This position also demonstrated the Muslim Brothers' passivity regarding resistance to 
the Israeli regime. Until the uprising, this policy advocated carrying on with life as usual 
in order to enable the movement to establish itself.  
 
 
The Islamic University in Gaza was different from other institutions in that it was 
established initially as an Islamic institute, although it also offered secular studies. The 
centerpiece of Muslim Brothers' power, it became the largest university in the Territories 
with the most political and social weight in the Gaza Strip.  
 
The Muslim Brothers controlled the student council at the university and also became the 
most organized of the Islamic groups in the Territories. Several active committees were 
established in the 1980s, including a cultural and educational committee, an art 
committee, a volunteer work committee, a mosque committee, and a sports committee. 
These became the movement's main propaganda tools in the Gaza Strip. The group 
distributed publications such as Al-Shihab (on behalf of the mosque committee) and Al-
Nidaa' (on behalf of the student council) and also irregular ideological publications such 
as "From The Young Generation's Desk" (Bi-aqlam al-Shabab).
21 In 1986 and 1987, the 
student council's Islamic preaching and guidance committee published a series headed 
"Voice of Truth, Power and Freedom" (Sawt al-Haqq Wal-Quwwah Wal- Hurriyyah), a 
well-known slogan of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt.
22 
 
The student council's culture committee was prolific, publishing some material that was 
openly circulated under the name of the Muslim Brothers.
23 The student council 
publications in Gaza were also more ideologically consolidated than those in the West 
Bank.  Al-Nidaa's bulletins included ideologically richer material from local writers, 
knowledgeable in the Muslim Brothers' philosophy. As a rule, their bulletin and other 
publications were similar to those of Islamic groups abroad. 
 
It should be noted, however, that the Islamic group's publications in Nablus' Al-Najah 
University were better funded than those in Islamic University, probably due to the 
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Muslim Brothers were part of the Jordanian government even after 1967. 
 
 
A prominent subject in all of the Islamic groups' publications was the rivalry with secular 
nationalist groups. In the West Bank, where the Muslim Brothers did not have as much 
control over popular centers as they did in parts of the Gaza Strip, the higher education 
institutes became the main arena for competition between the two camps. The rivalry was 
most fierce in Al-Najah University, which saw student clashes beyond the 
administration's control from the beginning of the 1980s until it was closed during the 
intifada. 
 
The Islamic groups circulated pamphlets
24 which, at their core, represented the cultural 
and social rivalry between the two sides - a rivalry which was most manifested at the 
universities. The West Bank institutions, which employed not only secular Arab 
instructors but also Americans and Europeans, became the center of secular revolution 
for many young people who came from villages and refugee camps. Since most members 
of the Islamic group came from similar homes and social status, they fought hard to 
preserve a traditional lifestyle in the face of Western influence in the universities. 
 
The issue of Palestine was also a prominent point of contention. The Islamic groups were 
mostly concerned with Islam in the Palestinian arena, though there was some mention of 
the jihad in Afghanistan and the trials of Muslim groups in Egypt and Syria. Mainly, the 
groups in the Territories addressed the PLO's political line and accused Arab 
governments of neglecting the Palestinian cause. They concentrated on Palestinian 
political problems or local problems arising from the Islamic-secular rivalry. 
 
The Palestine focus is to be expected given that Islamic Palestinian groups grew within a 
conflict that is nationalist in essence. Islamic supporters were well integrated into general 
Palestinian society. What is interesting, though, is that the Islamic groups were controlled 
by the Muslim Brothers, who, at least in the West Bank, were part of the Jordanian 
movement. But, the Muslim Brothers' transformation into a mainly Palestinian group that 
viewed the problems of the Arab Islamic world and of creating a large, new Arab state as 
secondary, was a direct result of the activities of Islamic groups in colleges and 
universities. Students during the 1980s had grown up fighting the Israeli occupation. 
Indeed, resisting the Israelis became the center of Palestinian political work in the 
Territories that led Islamic activists to address a question that became significant in 
Palestinian society: establishing the character and nature of the future independent state. 
 
Higher education institutions in the Territories became one of the centers of fighting the 
Israeli regime, and Islamic resistance was prominent. In violent riots initiated by leftist 
students at Bir Zeit in December 1986, Islamic group members played an active role for 
the first time. Both of the students killed in these clashes belonged to the Islamic group 
and were residents of the Gaza Strip.
25 Their residency is noteworthy because it 
represents an increase in the number of Gaza Strip residents who studied in West Bank 
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accelerated the militancy of Islamic groups in the West Bank.  
 
In summary, it appears that the flourishing of socio-political life in colleges and 
universities as central to the national Palestinian foundation in the Territories accelerated 
the organizational development of Islamic groups. The political implications of these 
changes were mainly felt during the intifada when the Muslim Brothers, in the form of 
the Gaza-born Hamas, openly opposed the Israeli regime. 
 
At the same time, though, a new Islamic opponent surfaced - the Islamic Jihad - which 
was more threatening ideologically than organizationally. The Muslim Brothers had 
difficulty coping with Islamic Jihad's rise in popularity in 1986 and 1987 after it 
committed itself to violence against Israel, something the Muslim Brothers had 
consistently refrained from doing until that point. 
 
The strengthening of the organizational infrastructure of Islamic groups in colleges and 
universities gave impetus to the growth of the revolutionary faction of Islamic Jihad in 
the territories. In contrast to the Muslim Brothers' leadership, which consisted of older, 
religious establishment figures, Islamic Jihad's leadership came from students and 
academics who had spent time in Egyptian universities in the 1970s and absorbed the 
revolutionary militancy of groups there.  
 
The elitist concept of a revolutionary group whose role was to lead the masses found an 
attentive audience among university activists. Unlike the Muslim Brothers, the 
Palestinian Islamic Jihad was enthused by the success of Iran's Islamic revolution. From 
its mid-1982 founding at Islamic University in Gaza, the group publicized its 
disagreement with the Muslim Brothers over Iran's revolution. Its first publication
26 
contained the movement's main ideas: Khomeini's call to the Muslims of the world; an 
article about the Islamic revolution of oppressed led by 'Iz al-Din al-Qassam; a call for 
permanent and organized dialogue among the Islamic groups; the battle against the 
tyranny of the Arab regimes based on the philosophy of Sayyid Qutb; and raising jihad to 
the top of the Islamic struggle's agenda. 
 
Next, it ran in the 1982 student council elections under the name "The Independent 
Islamists" (Al- Islamiyyun al-Mustaqillun). In 1984, the group attempted to form a 
faction called "The Islamic Student Movement" (Al-Harakah al-Islamiyyah al-
Tulabiyyah) and published and distributed handwritten promotional material at the end of 
1983 at Islamic University. This flyer attacked the old Muslim Brothers' student council 
for kindling the fire of disagreement instead of striving to unite the Islamic groups. It 
cited the council's ban on the circulation of the new group's publications and compared 
the Muslim Brothers to a repressive government.
27  
 
It is interesting that Islamic Jihad's first flyer in the Territories was not published in Gaza 
but rather in Al-Najah University in Nablus in May 1983.
28 The flyer severely attacked 
the university's secular student council for publishing a long declaration against the 
Islamic movement on different issues, including the support of the Islamic revolution in 
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secular nationalists' neglect of the Palestinian cause. 
 
The year 1985 marked a new organizational feat for Islamic Jihad. It succeeded in 
forming as a proper party in several universities in the Territories under the name "The 
Islamic Group" (Al-Jama'ah Al-Islamiyyah) - a name borrowed from Egyptian student 
groups. This name, signaling Islamic violence, was used until the university was closed 
during the intifada. The group became the student faction of the Jihad movement.  
 
Islamic Jihad differed from the Muslim Brothers and the nationalist groups on three basic 
points. The first was their support of the Iranian revolution. The second concerned the 
Palestine issue. Islamic Jihad favored military action against Israel, which served as a 
common denominator with the nationalist groups, especially Fatah. Inherent in its 
publications was harsh criticism of the Muslim Brothers' passive stance. And, the third 
difference concerned the unity of Islamic groups, not only in the Territories but 
throughout the Arab world. Islamic Jihad was influenced here by Shi'a Iran, which 
wanted to end discord with Sunni Muslims and rebuild the Caliphate state. Anyone who 
disagreed with Islamic Jihad's strategy was declared an enemy. (In contrast, the Muslim 
Brothers emphasized Islamic pluralism.) 
 
The revolutionary faction within Islamic Jihad was the only one to act as an official party 
in Islamic University and in the universities in the West Bank. It refrained from using the 
name "Islamic Jihad" until June 1987, when it distributed a flyer bearing the name 
"Islamic Jihad Organization" at Islamic University. By October and November of 1987, it 
was the only name used and became the permanent name of the group led by  Shaykh 
As’ad al-Tamimi during the intifada. The group affiliated with Fatah in the Gaza Strip 
began calling itself "The Islamic Jihad Squadrons" (Saraya al-Jihad al-Islami) and in the 
West Bank it added the words "Jerusalem/the temple" (Bait al-Maqdes).  
 
The Islamic Jihad's bulletins were dull in comparison to those of the Islamic groups of 
the Muslim Brothers and contained few details regarding their groups' activities in 
different institutes, revealing Jihad's inferior position in the higher education institutions 
in numbers, organization, and finances. 
 
Until the outbreak of the intifada, the revolutionary Islamic Jihad group was only 
successful in Gaza, where it originated. In Islamic University's male and female student 
union elections in 1984 through 1986, it obtained six to seven percent of the male 
students' votes and a lower percentage among the female students. In the 1987 elections, 
held immediately after the outbreak of the uprising, it polled 15 percent of the votes. One 
may assume that this relatively high percentage is mainly due to the military actions of 
the other Jihad factions. 
 
It seems that the main importance of the revolutionary faction in colleges and universities 
in the Territories lay more in its challenge to other Islamic groups than in any of its own 
achievements. It did supply the ideological basis that encouraged the forming of armed 
Islamic Jihad groups in 1986 and 1987, which implemented the revolutionary group's 
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among the young generation of Muslim Brothers. Its activity and mode of organization 
were based on the student arena, most strongly at Islamic University. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The higher education institutions in the Territories had a crucial effect on the 
development of most Islamic groups, particularly the Muslim Brothers and the 
revolutionary faction of the Islamic Jihad. It molded a new, young, and educated 
generation that filled important leadership positions in these groups. This generation, 
which grew up in the midst of the general Palestinian national struggle in the Territories, 
introduced Palestinian patriotism to the Islamic arena in lieu of the "Islamic 
cosmopolitanism" which characterized the Muslim Brothers until the 1980s. It also 
emphasized the political and cultural struggle between Islamic groups and popular 
nationalist secular groups. Actually, until the December 1987 intifada, colleges and 
universities were the main arena for Palestinian-Israeli conflict, a prelude of what was to 
engulf the whole Palestinian community during the uprising. In time, the young veterans 
of the secular-religious conflict would form the indigenous leadership of the intifada 
against the Israelis. 
 
This secular-religious conflict also had a cultural dimension. The universities and 
colleges in the Territories, especially those in the West Bank, accelerated the absorption 
of Western secular culture, particularly among the lower class, traditional folk who 
comprised the majority of the student population. Daily exposure to Israeli society also 
contributed a Western influence. Bir Zeit University and Bethlehem University became 
the centers of the cultural struggle, with a notable number of Christian professors, local 
and foreign, and even Israeli Arab citizens. Al-Najah University in Nablus, despite 
having a Muslim character and very few Christian students and professors, developed a 
relatively strong Marxist element side by side alongside labor and professional unions. 
 
Attempts were also made in the universities to create Palestinian cultural roots by 
exhibiting clothing, food, agricultural tools, and buildings from the pre-1948 era. Similar 
attempts at emphasizing the Canaanite heritage of the Palestinians, especially in Samarea, 
increased to a large extent immediately after the establishment of the Palestinian 
Authority in the 1990s. As in other Arab and Islamic countries (the Pharaonic culture in 
Egypt, the Phoenic in Lebanon, the Pan-Turan in Turkey and the pre Islamic Iranian-
Persian one), these attempts led to religious tension and were sometimes seen as part of 
an anti-Islam battle. In general, Palestinian culture in the Territories (and outside of them 
since 1967) developed along secular lines, largely influenced by left-wing artists. 
  
During the second half of the 1980s - right before the uprising - the Muslim Brothers 
were strong rivals of the secular nationalists among PLO supporters in the Territories. 
Their popularity was based partly on their passivity in the struggle against Israel. The 
tension between the Muslim Brothers and the secularists is well-illustrated by the 
booklets circulated by both sides during the 1987 student council elections at Islamic 
University. 
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In the Muslim Brothers' Al-Haqiqah al-Gha’ibah (The Absent Truth),
29 the group quite 
apologetically presents its contribution to the Palestinian struggle since the 1930s through 
the participation of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers in the wars against Israel from 1948 
until 1967. The booklet's main weak spot, exposed by the Muslim Brothers' opponents, 
was the fact that this contribution ceased in the same years in which "the Islamic holy 
places, foremost the Al-Aqsa mosque, fell into the hands of the Jews." The movement 
could not claim any achievements for the liberation of Palestine between 1967 and1987. 
 
  The combination of cultural and political battles was characteristic of the Palestinian 
students' activities in all the higher education institutions from 1980 until the uprising. 
The uprising spread the battle to the entire Palestinian population. The establishment of 
the Palestinian Authority worsened the internal conflict. The centricity of the higher 
education institutes to the development of both the Islamic and nationalist groups 
strongly points out to two issues related to Israel which up until now have not been given 
proper attention.  
 
Israel completely ignored the growth of Islamic socio-cultural and national-secular 
foundations in these institutions, as they were not violent. In certain respects, Israel's 
behavior was a historical repetition of British behavior toward Jewish universities during 
the mandate period, chiefly Hebrew University in Jerusalem and the Technion in Haifa. 
But unlike the British, who were foreigners and did not consider themselves responsible 
for the future of the country, Israel is sure to be closely involved in the development of 
Palestinian society even after a permanent agreement is reached. 
 
Israel's apathy regarding Palestinian social developments in the Territories contributed to 
its inability to read the "Palestinian map" correctly. It misjudged the intensity of hatred 
toward the Israeli occupation, the causes of the national uprising headed by the lower 
classes in refugee camps, and the growth of Islamic groups and their deep hold on 
society. This hold was achieved mainly by community socio-cultural-educational activity 
centered in higher education institutions. 
 
A second point concerning Israel is its conscious and unconscious influence on 
Palestinian society in the Territories. Palestinian colleges and universities and social 
foundations, both on the Islamic side and on the nationalist-secular side, continuously 
nurtured the study of Israeli society - an ability to read the "Israeli map" and analyze the 
events in Israel. The large-scale employment of Palestinians in Israel, which grew in the 
1980s, naturally contributed to this understanding, but it was also common among the 
lower classes both in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank. 
 
When members of these classes became a main force in Palestinian higher education in 
the Territories, they used their familiarity with Israeli society as a means of personal and 
national advancement. Palestinian colleges and universities manifested the two most 
important elements of Israeli society: education as the key to personal and collective 
advancement, and democratic pluralism. 
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